Category Archives: Lion Air

Boeing dedicates $50 million of pledged $100 million to near-term relief for families of the victims of the Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 accidents

Boeing has made this announcement:

Boeing has announced that it has dedicated $50 million of a previously announced $100 million fund to provide near-term financial assistance to families of the victims of the Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Flight 302 accidents.

Boeing also announced that it has retained Kenneth Feinberg and Camille Biros, renowned experts in establishing and overseeing victims’ compensation funds, to design and administer the fund.

“The tragic loss of life in both accidents continues to weigh heavily on all of us at Boeing, and we have the utmost sympathy for the loved ones of those on board,” said Dennis Muilenburg, Boeing chairman, president and CEO. “Through our partnership with Feinberg and Biros, we hope affected families receive needed assistance as quickly and efficiently as possible.”

The $50 million fund represents the initial expenditure of a $100 million pledge by Boeing to address family and community needs of those affected by the accidents. All monies distributed by Mr. Feinberg and Ms. Biros will be independent from any resolution provided through the legal process.

“We are honored to take on this important assignment of providing needed financial relief to the families of these two tragedies,” added Kenneth Feinberg.

Co-Administrator Camille Biros continued, “We know how important it is to assist the families of the victims who have endured a personal tragedy and will work to design and administer the fund and distribute the money as efficiently and expeditiously as possible.”

Copyright Photo: Joe G. Walker.

Note: Meanwhile all of the Boeing 737 MAX airplanes in the world remain grounded and out of service.

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Video: Rogue Boeing 737 Max planes ‘with minds of their own’

New video from 60 Minutes Australia:

Liz Hayes investigates the disaster of Boeing’s 737 MAX jetliner. Why two supposedly state-of-the-art and safe planes crashed killing 346 people; why pilots now fear flying the 737 MAX; and whether Boeing could have averted the catastrophes.

Boeing statement on AOA Disagree Alert

Boeing has issued this statement:

On every airplane delivered to our customers, including the MAX, all flight data and information needed to safely operate the aircraft is provided in the flight deck on the primary flight deck displays. This information is provided full-time in the pilots’ primary field of view, and it always has been.

Air speed, attitude, altitude, vertical speed, heading and engine power settings are the primary parameters the flight crews use to safely operate the airplane in normal flight. Stick shaker and the pitch limit indicator are the primary features used for the operation of the airplane at elevated angles of attack. All recommended pilot actions, checklists, and training are based upon these primary indicators. Neither the angle of attack indicator nor the AOA Disagree alert are necessary for the safe operation of the airplane. They provide supplemental information only, and have never been considered safety features on commercial jet transport airplanes.

The Boeing design requirements for the 737 MAX included the AOA Disagree alert as a standard, standalone feature, in keeping with Boeing’s fundamental design philosophy of retaining commonality with the 737NG. In 2017, within several months after beginning 737 MAX deliveries, engineers at Boeing identified that the 737 MAX display system software did not correctly meet the AOA Disagree alert requirements. The software delivered to Boeing linked the AOA Disagree alert to the AOA indicator, which is an optional feature on the MAX and the NG. Accordingly, the software activated the AOA Disagree alert only if an airline opted for the AOA indicator. 

When the discrepancy between the requirements and the software was identified, Boeing followed its standard process for determining the appropriate resolution of such issues. That review, which involved multiple company subject matter experts, determined that the absence of the AOA Disagree alert did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation. Accordingly, the review concluded, the existing functionality was acceptable until the alert and the indicator could be delinked in the next planned display system software update. Senior company leadership was not involved in the review and first became aware of this issue in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident.

Approximately a week after the Lion Air accident, on November 6, 2018, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB), which was followed a day later by the FAA’s issuance of an Airworthiness Directive (AD). In identifying the AOA Disagree alert as one among a number of indications that could result from erroneous AOA, both the OMB and the AD described the AOA Disagree alert feature as available only if the AOA indicator option is installed.

Image: Boeing.

Boeing discussed the status of the AOA Disagree alert with the FAA in the wake of the Lion Air accident. At that time, Boeing informed the FAA that Boeing engineers had identified the software issue in 2017 and had determined per Boeing’s standard process that the issue did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation. In December 2018, Boeing convened a Safety Review Board (SRB) to consider again whether the absence of the AOA Disagree alert from certain 737 MAX flight displays presented a safety issue. That SRB confirmed Boeing’s prior conclusion that it did not. Boeing shared this conclusion and the supporting SRB analysis with the FAA.

Boeing is issuing a display system software update, to implement the AOA Disagree alert as a standard, standalone feature before the MAX returns to service. When the MAX returns to service, all MAX production aircraft will have an activated and operable AOA Disagree alert and an optional angle of attack indicator. All customers with previously delivered MAX airplanes will have the ability to activate the AOA Disagree alert.

First Lion Air A330neo rolls-out of the Airbus paint shop

Airbus has made this announcement:

The first A330neo for Lion Air Group has rolled out of the Airbus paint shop in Toulouse, France, featuring the airline’s distinctive livery. The aircraft will be operated on lease from BOC Aviation.

Altogether, Lion Air Group will acquire 10 A330neo aircraft, eight of which will be leased from BOC Aviation. The aircraft will have a single-class layout seating 440 passengers and will be operated by Lion Air on selected domestic routes, as well as charter and pilgrimage service to Saudi Arabia. Some of the aircraft will be operated by Thai Lion on long-haul services from Thailand.

The first aircraft will now continue its industrial process and proceed soon to ground and flight tests, before the delivery to the airline in the coming weeks.

The A330neo is the true new-generation aircraft building on the best-selling widebody A330’s features and leveraging on A350 XWB technology. Powered by the latest Rolls-Royce Trent 7000 engines, the A330neo provides an unprecedented level of efficiency – with 25% lower fuel burn per seat than previous generation competitors. Equipped with the Airspace by Airbus cabin, the A330neo offers a unique passenger experience with more personal space and the latest generation in-flight entertainment system and connectivity.

Photo: Airbus.

Lion Air honors its last Boeing 747-400 as one era ends and a new Airbus A330neo era begins

Lion Air made this announcement:

Lion Air, member of Lion Air Group, honored the milestone of 19 years of flight operations and recognized the end of Boeing 747-400 operations with the registration of PK-LHG.

First operated on April 23, 2009 by Lion Air, the last Boeing 747-400 had a capacity of 12 business class seats and 492 economy classes.

Lion Air is very proud to have operated the “Queen of the Skies” for 10 years to serve its domestic (Indonesia) market such as Soekarno-Hatta Tangerang, Medan Kualanamu, Batam, Surabaya, Denpasar and Makassar, as well as international destinations to Jeddah and Madinah, in Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, Lion Air gives the highest appreciation for the end of the Boeing 747-400 operations through a special event that raised the theme of the last moment and prepared to welcome the new aircraft “Last Moment of Boeing 747-400 and Welcoming Airbus A330-900neo”.

The Airbus A330-900neo wide-body aircraft will be delivered in stages according to schedule and the first is planned to arrive in Indonesia in May 2019. This year, Lion Air will receive two aircraft.

Lion Air in 2018 has ordered ten (10) Airbus A330-900neo aircraft and has the option of obtaining four similar aircraft. The ten planes are scheduled for delivery to Lion Air Group in 2019 and 2020.

The operation of Airbus A330neo will provide added value to customers with the presence of direct flying, including nonstop Umrah flights (Middle East) from Makassar; South Sulawesi to Medina; Balikpapan, East Borneo Kalimantan to Jeddah; Surabaya, East Java to Madinah; Solo; Central Java to Jeddah.

Moreover, Lion Air is preparing to expand its tourism market to South Asia, including India.

Editor’s Note: The pictured Boeing 747-412 PK-LHG last flew on December 2, 2018 as flight LNI 111 between Jeddah and Jakarta (CGK). It has been in storage since them.

Top Photos: Lion Air.

Lion Air aircraft slide show:

Bottom Copyright Photo: Sister ship Boeing 747-412 PK-LHF was previously retired in January 2016. Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 747-412 PK-LHF (msn 24063) CGK (Michael B. Ing). Image: 946064.

Type Retired: December 2, 2018 (LNI 111 Jeddah-Jakarta with PK-LHG)

Bloomberg: Lion Air considers a switch to Airbus, its 10 Boeing 737-8 MAX 8s are grounded

Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQF (msn 42990) DPS (Pascal Simon). Image: 945950.

Lion Air is planning to cancel its large Boeing 737 MAX order and switch to Airbus according to a report by Bloomberg.

A rift has developed between Lion Air founder Rusdi Kirana and Boeing over Boeing’s reaction to the tragic October 29, 2018 Lion Air MAX 8 crash. Boeing pointed to maintenance issues and possible pilot error as a possible reason for the crash while growing evidence indicates a faulty sensor took over the computerized system of the aircraft.

Lion Air issued this statement on the grounding of its Boeing 737-8 MAX 8s:

In connection with a circular from the Director General of Civil Aviation of the Ministry of Transportation regarding temporary grounding of Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, Lion Air states that it will temporarily suspend its 10 (ten) Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft.

Lion Air is considering a large order for the Airbus A321neo.

Meanwhile Lion Air has cancelled for MAX deliveries this year.

Read the full report: CLICK HERE

Top Copyright Photo: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQF (msn 42990) DPS (Pascal Simon). Image: 945950.

Lion Air aircraft slide show:

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Indonesia grounds all Boeing 737 MAX aircraft for inspections

Republic of Indonesia, the scene of the first Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 crash (Lion Air flight JT 610), has now grounded all Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in country for renewed inspections, effective tomorrow, March 12.

Read more from Bloomberg: CLICK HERE

Delivered August 13, 2018, crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018

Above Copyright Photo: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQP (msn 43000) BFI (James Helbock). Image: 944190.

Lion Air flight JT 610 (from Wikipedia):

Lion Air Flight 610 was a scheduled domestic flight operated by the Indonesian airline Lion Air from Soekarno–Hatta International Airport in Jakarta to Depati Amir Airport in Pangkal Pinang. On 29 October 2018, the Boeing 737 MAX 8 (PK-LQP) operating the route crashed into the Java Sea 12 minutes after takeoff. All 189 passengers and crew were killed in the accident. It became the second deadliest airplane accident in Indonesia, only behind Garuda Indonesia Flight 152.

This was the first major accident involving the 737 MAX and the deadliest involving a 737 aircraft surpassing Air India Express Flight 812 in 2010. It is also the worst accident for Lion Air in its 18-year history, surpassing the previous crash in Surakarta that killed 25.

A preliminary investigation revealed problems noticed by passengers and crew on the aircraft’s previous flight, as well as signs of instrument failure on previous flights. As a result, Boeing issued a warning to all operators of the 737 MAX series to avoid causing an abrupt dive similar to the Lion Air flight.

The Republic of Indonesia issued this preliminary report on flight JT 610 on October 29, 2018:

SYNOPSIS

On 28 October 2018, a Boeing 737-8 (MAX) aircraft registered PK-LQP was being operated by PT. Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air) as a scheduled passenger flight from I Gusti Ngurah Rai International Airport (WADD), Denpasar to Jakarta as LNI043. During pre-flight check, the PIC discussed with the engineer of the maintenance actions that had been performed including replacement of the AoA sensor and had been tested accordingly.

The aircraft departed at 1420 UTC (2220 LT) at night time, the DFDR showed the stick shaker activated during the rotation and remained active throughout the flight. About 400 feet, the PIC noticed on the PFD the IAS DISAGREE warning appeared. The PIC handed over control to the SIC and cross checked the PFDs with the standby instrument and determined that the left PFD had the problem. The PIC noticed the aircraft was automatically trimming AND. The PIC moved the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT and the SIC continued the flight with manual trim without auto-pilot until the end of the flight.

The PIC declared “PAN PAN” to the Denpasar Approach controller due to instrument failure and requested to maintain runway heading. The PIC performed three Non-Normal Checklists and none contained the instruction “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”.

The remainder of the flight was uneventful and the aircraft landed Jakarta about 1556 UTC. After parking, the PIC informed the engineer about the aircraft problem and entered IAS and ALT Disagree and FEEL DIFF PRESS problem on the AFML.

The engineer performed flushing the left Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) and static ADM to rectify the IAS and ALT disagree followed by operation test on ground and found satisfied. The Feel Differential Pressure was rectified by performed cleaned electrical connector plug of elevator feel computer. The test on ground found the problem had been solved.

At 2320 UTC, (0620 on 29 October 2018 LT), the aircraft departed from Jakarta with intended destination of Pangkal Pinang. The DFDR recorded a difference between left and right AoA of about 20° and continued until the end of recording. During rotation the left control column stick shaker activated and continued for most of the flight.

During the flight the SIC asked the controller to confirm the altitude of the aircraft and later also asked the speed as shown on the controller radar display. The SIC reported experienced„flight control problem‟.

After the flaps retracted, the DFDR recorded automatic AND trim active followed by flight crew commanded ANU trim. The automatic AND trim stopped when the flaps extended. When the flaps retracted to 0, the automatic AND trim and flight crew commanded ANU trim began again and continued for the remainder of the flight. At 23:31:54 UTC, the DFDR stopped recording.

Until the publishing of this Preliminary Report, the CVR has not been recovered, the search for CVR is continuing. The investigation will perform several tests including the test of the AoA sensor and the aircraft simulator exercises in the Boeing engineering simulator. The investigation has received the QAR data for flight for analysis.

The investigation involved the NTSB of the United States of America as State of design and State of manufacturer, the TSIB of Singapore and the ATSB of Australia as State provide assistant that assigned accredited representatives according to ICAO Annex 13.

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1 History of the Flight

On 29 October 2018, a Boeing 737-8 (MAX) aircraft registered PK-LQP was being operated by PT. Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air) as a scheduled passenger flight from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta1 with intended destination of Depati Amir Airport (WIPK), Pangkal Pinang2. The scheduled time of departure from Jakarta was 0545 LT (2245 UTC3 on 28 October 2018) as LNI610.

At 2320 UTC, the aircraft departed from Jakarta using runway 25L and intended cruising altitude was 27,000 feet. The LNI610 pilot was instructed to follow the Standard Instrument Departure (SID) of ABASA 1C4.

According to the weight and balance sheet, on board the aircraft were two pilots, five flight attendants and 181 passengers consisted of 178 adult, one child and two infants. The voyage report5 showed that the number of flight attendant on board was six flight attendants.

The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) recorded a difference between left and right Angle of Attack (AoA)6 of about 20° and continued until the end of recording. During rotation the left control column stick shaker7 activated and continued for most of the flight.

Shortly after departure, the Jakarta Tower controller instructed LNI610 to contact Terminal East (TE) controller. At 23:21:22 UTC, the LNI60 SIC made initial contact with the TE controller who responded that the aircraft was identified on the controller Aircraft Situational Display/ASD (radar display). Thereafter, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to climb to altitude 27,000 feet.

At 23:21:28 UTC, the LNI610 SIC asked the TE controller to confirm the altitude of the aircraft as shown on the TE controller radar display. The TE controller responded that the aircraft altitude was 900 feet and was acknowledged by the LNI610 Second in Command (SIC).

At 23:21:53 UTC, the LNI610 SIC requested approval to the TE controller “to some holding point”. The TE controller asked the LNI610 the problem of the aircraft andthe pilot responded “flight control problem”.

The LNI610 descended from altitude 1,700 to 1,600 feet and the TE controller then asked the LNI610 of the intended altitude. The LNI610 SIC advised the TE controller that the intended altitude was 5,000 feet.

At 23:22:05 UTC, the DFDR recorded the aircraft altitude was approximately 2,150 feet and the flaps were retracted. After the flaps reached 0, the DFDR recorded automatic aircraft nose down (AND) trim active for 10 seconds followed by flight crew commanded aircraft nose up (ANU) trim.

At 23:22:31 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to climb and maintain altitude of 5,000 feet and to turn left heading 050°. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:22:48 UTC, the flaps extended to 5 and the automatic AND trim stopped.

At 23:22:56 UTC, the LNI610 SIC asked the TE controller the speed as indicated on the radar display. The TE controller responded to the LNI610 that the ground speed of the aircraft shown on the radar display was 322 knots.

At 23:24:51 UTC, the TE controller added “FLIGHT CONT TROB” text for LNI610 target label on the controller radar system as reminder that the flight was experiencing flight control problem.

At 23:25:05 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn left heading 350° and maintain altitude of 5,000 feet. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:25:18 UTC, the flaps retracted to 0. At 23:25:27 UTC, the automatic AND trim and flight crew commanded ANU trim recorded began again and continued for the remainder of the flight.

At 23:26:32 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn right heading 050° and maintain altitude of 5,000 feet. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:26:59 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn right heading 070° to avoid traffic. The LNI610 pilot did not respond to the TE controller‟s instruction, thereafter, the controller called the LNI610 twice who responded at 23:27:13 UTC.

At 23:27:15 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn right heading 090° which was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC. A few second later, the TE controller revised the instruction to stop the turn and fly heading 070° which was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:28:15 UTC, the TE controller provided traffic information to the LNI610 who responded “ZERO”. About 14 seconds later, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn left heading 050° and maintain an altitude of 5,000 feet. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:29:37 UTC, the TE controller questioned the LNI610 whether the aircraft was descending as the TE controller noticed that the aircraft was descending. The LNI610 SIC advised the TE controller that they had a flight control problem and were flying the aircraft manually.

At 23:29:45 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to maintain heading 050° and contact the Arrival (ARR) controller. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:30:03 UTC, the LNI610 contacted the ARR controller and advised that they were experiencing a flight control problem. The ARR controller advised LNI610 to prepare for landing on runway 25L and instructed them to fly heading 070°. The instruction was read back by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:30:58 UTC, the LNI610 SIC stated “LNI650 due to weather request proceed to ESALA8” which was approved by the ARR controller.

At 23:31:09 UTC, the LNI610 PIC advised the ARR controller that the altitude of the aircraft could not be determined due to all aircraft instruments indicating different altitudes. The pilot used the call sign of LNI650 during the communication. The ARR controller acknowledged then stated “LNI610 no restriction”.

At 23:31:23 UTC, the LNI610 PIC requested the ARR controller to block altitude 3,000 feet above and below for traffic avoidance. The ARR controller asked what altitude the pilot wanted. At 23:31:35 UTC, the LNI610 PIC responded “five thou”. The ARR controller approved the pilot request.

At 23:31:54 UTC, the FDR stopped recording.

The ARR controller attempted to contact LNI610 twice with no response. At 23:32:19 UTC, the LNI610 target disappeared from the ASD and changed to flight plan track. The ARR controller and TE controller attempted to contact LNI610 four more times with no response.

The ARR controller then checked the last known coordinates of LNI610 and instructed the assistant to report the occurrence to the operations manager.

The ARR controller requested several aircraft to hold over the last known position of LNI610 and to conduct a visual search of the area.

About 0005 UTC (0705 LT), tug boat personnel found floating debris at 5°48’56.04″S; 107° 7’23.04″E which was about 33 Nm from Jakarta on bearing 56°. The debris was later identified as LNI610.

Read the full report: CLICK HERE