Tag Archives: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines)

Indonesian investigators blame a series of mistakes for the crash of Lion Air 610

Delivered August 13, 2018, crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018

National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia has issued their final report on the crash of Lion Air flight 610.

The investigators faulted Boeing, Lion Air and the pilots for the tragic crash.

The report criticized the purchase of the critical sensor from a Florida repair shop that had not been properly tested and calibrated.

The report spotlighted 9 things that contributed to the accident.

Reliance on the single angle-of-attack sensor made MCAS more vulnerable to failure.

Read more from the BBC.

Boeing issued this response to the report:

Boeing Statement On Lion Air Flight 610 Investigation Final Report.

Boeing issued the following statement regarding the release of the final investigation report of Lion Air Flight 610 by Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (KNKT):

“On behalf of everyone at Boeing, I want to convey our heartfelt condolences to the families and loved ones of those who lost their lives in these accidents. We mourn with Lion Air, and we would like to express our deepest sympathies to the Lion Air family,” said Boeing President & CEO Dennis Muilenburg. “These tragic events have deeply affected us all and we will always remember what happened.”

“We commend Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee for its extensive efforts to determine the facts of this accident, the contributing factors to its cause and recommendations aimed toward our common goal that this never happens again.”

“We are addressing the KNKT’s safety recommendations, and taking actions to enhance the safety of the 737 MAX to prevent the flight control conditions that occurred in this accident from ever happening again. Safety is an enduring value for everyone at Boeing and the safety of the flying public, our customers, and the crews aboard our airplanes is always our top priority. We value our long-standing partnership with Lion Air and we look forward to continuing to work together in the future.”

Boeing experts, working as technical advisors to the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, have supported the KNKT over the course of the investigation. The company’s engineers have been working with the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other global regulators to make software updates and other changes, taking into account the information from the KNKT’s investigation.

Since this accident, the 737 MAX and its software are undergoing an unprecedented level of global regulatory oversight, testing and analysis. This includes hundreds of simulator sessions and test flights, regulatory analysis of thousands of documents, reviews by regulators and independent experts and extensive certification requirements.

Over the past several months Boeing has been making changes to the 737 MAX. Most significantly, Boeing has redesigned the way Angle of Attack (AoA) sensors work with a feature of the flight control software known as Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). Going forward, MCAS will compare information from both AoA sensors before activating, adding a new layer of protection.

In addition, MCAS will now only turn on if both AoA sensors agree, will only activate once in response to erroneous AOA, and will always be subject to a maximum limit that can be overridden with the control column.

These software changes will prevent the flight control conditions that occurred in this accident from ever happening again.

In addition, Boeing is updating crew manuals and pilot training, designed to ensure every pilot has all of the information they need to fly the 737 MAX safely.

Boeing continues to work with the FAA and other regulatory agencies worldwide on the certification of the software update and training program to safely return the 737 MAX to service.

Top Copyright Photo: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQP (msn 43000) BFI (James Helbock). Image: 944189.

 

 

The Lion Air families are briefed on the Boeing 737 MAX crash by Indonesian authorities

From Reuters:

Mechanical and design issues contributed to the crash of a Lion Air 737 MAX jet according to Reuters reporting on a briefing by Indonesian investigators for the victims’ families ahead of the release of the report.

A final report will be released on Friday.

Read the full Reuters report.

Lion Air honors its last Boeing 747-400 as one era ends and a new Airbus A330neo era begins

Lion Air made this announcement:

Lion Air, member of Lion Air Group, honored the milestone of 19 years of flight operations and recognized the end of Boeing 747-400 operations with the registration of PK-LHG.

First operated on April 23, 2009 by Lion Air, the last Boeing 747-400 had a capacity of 12 business class seats and 492 economy classes.

Lion Air is very proud to have operated the “Queen of the Skies” for 10 years to serve its domestic (Indonesia) market such as Soekarno-Hatta Tangerang, Medan Kualanamu, Batam, Surabaya, Denpasar and Makassar, as well as international destinations to Jeddah and Madinah, in Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, Lion Air gives the highest appreciation for the end of the Boeing 747-400 operations through a special event that raised the theme of the last moment and prepared to welcome the new aircraft “Last Moment of Boeing 747-400 and Welcoming Airbus A330-900neo”.

The Airbus A330-900neo wide-body aircraft will be delivered in stages according to schedule and the first is planned to arrive in Indonesia in May 2019. This year, Lion Air will receive two aircraft.

Lion Air in 2018 has ordered ten (10) Airbus A330-900neo aircraft and has the option of obtaining four similar aircraft. The ten planes are scheduled for delivery to Lion Air Group in 2019 and 2020.

The operation of Airbus A330neo will provide added value to customers with the presence of direct flying, including nonstop Umrah flights (Middle East) from Makassar; South Sulawesi to Medina; Balikpapan, East Borneo Kalimantan to Jeddah; Surabaya, East Java to Madinah; Solo; Central Java to Jeddah.

Moreover, Lion Air is preparing to expand its tourism market to South Asia, including India.

Editor’s Note: The pictured Boeing 747-412 PK-LHG last flew on December 2, 2018 as flight LNI 111 between Jeddah and Jakarta (CGK). It has been in storage since them.

Top Photos: Lion Air.

Lion Air aircraft slide show:

Bottom Copyright Photo: Sister ship Boeing 747-412 PK-LHF was previously retired in January 2016. Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 747-412 PK-LHF (msn 24063) CGK (Michael B. Ing). Image: 946064.

Type Retired: December 2, 2018 (LNI 111 Jeddah-Jakarta with PK-LHG)

Bloomberg: Lion Air considers a switch to Airbus, its 10 Boeing 737-8 MAX 8s are grounded

Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQF (msn 42990) DPS (Pascal Simon). Image: 945950.

Lion Air is planning to cancel its large Boeing 737 MAX order and switch to Airbus according to a report by Bloomberg.

A rift has developed between Lion Air founder Rusdi Kirana and Boeing over Boeing’s reaction to the tragic October 29, 2018 Lion Air MAX 8 crash. Boeing pointed to maintenance issues and possible pilot error as a possible reason for the crash while growing evidence indicates a faulty sensor took over the computerized system of the aircraft.

Lion Air issued this statement on the grounding of its Boeing 737-8 MAX 8s:

In connection with a circular from the Director General of Civil Aviation of the Ministry of Transportation regarding temporary grounding of Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, Lion Air states that it will temporarily suspend its 10 (ten) Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft.

Lion Air is considering a large order for the Airbus A321neo.

Meanwhile Lion Air has cancelled for MAX deliveries this year.

Read the full report: CLICK HERE

Top Copyright Photo: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQF (msn 42990) DPS (Pascal Simon). Image: 945950.

Lion Air aircraft slide show:

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Indonesia grounds all Boeing 737 MAX aircraft for inspections

Republic of Indonesia, the scene of the first Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 crash (Lion Air flight JT 610), has now grounded all Boeing 737 MAX aircraft in country for renewed inspections, effective tomorrow, March 12.

Read more from Bloomberg: CLICK HERE

Delivered August 13, 2018, crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018

Above Copyright Photo: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQP (msn 43000) BFI (James Helbock). Image: 944190.

Lion Air flight JT 610 (from Wikipedia):

Lion Air Flight 610 was a scheduled domestic flight operated by the Indonesian airline Lion Air from Soekarno–Hatta International Airport in Jakarta to Depati Amir Airport in Pangkal Pinang. On 29 October 2018, the Boeing 737 MAX 8 (PK-LQP) operating the route crashed into the Java Sea 12 minutes after takeoff. All 189 passengers and crew were killed in the accident. It became the second deadliest airplane accident in Indonesia, only behind Garuda Indonesia Flight 152.

This was the first major accident involving the 737 MAX and the deadliest involving a 737 aircraft surpassing Air India Express Flight 812 in 2010. It is also the worst accident for Lion Air in its 18-year history, surpassing the previous crash in Surakarta that killed 25.

A preliminary investigation revealed problems noticed by passengers and crew on the aircraft’s previous flight, as well as signs of instrument failure on previous flights. As a result, Boeing issued a warning to all operators of the 737 MAX series to avoid causing an abrupt dive similar to the Lion Air flight.

The Republic of Indonesia issued this preliminary report on flight JT 610 on October 29, 2018:

SYNOPSIS

On 28 October 2018, a Boeing 737-8 (MAX) aircraft registered PK-LQP was being operated by PT. Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air) as a scheduled passenger flight from I Gusti Ngurah Rai International Airport (WADD), Denpasar to Jakarta as LNI043. During pre-flight check, the PIC discussed with the engineer of the maintenance actions that had been performed including replacement of the AoA sensor and had been tested accordingly.

The aircraft departed at 1420 UTC (2220 LT) at night time, the DFDR showed the stick shaker activated during the rotation and remained active throughout the flight. About 400 feet, the PIC noticed on the PFD the IAS DISAGREE warning appeared. The PIC handed over control to the SIC and cross checked the PFDs with the standby instrument and determined that the left PFD had the problem. The PIC noticed the aircraft was automatically trimming AND. The PIC moved the STAB TRIM switches to CUT OUT and the SIC continued the flight with manual trim without auto-pilot until the end of the flight.

The PIC declared “PAN PAN” to the Denpasar Approach controller due to instrument failure and requested to maintain runway heading. The PIC performed three Non-Normal Checklists and none contained the instruction “Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport”.

The remainder of the flight was uneventful and the aircraft landed Jakarta about 1556 UTC. After parking, the PIC informed the engineer about the aircraft problem and entered IAS and ALT Disagree and FEEL DIFF PRESS problem on the AFML.

The engineer performed flushing the left Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) and static ADM to rectify the IAS and ALT disagree followed by operation test on ground and found satisfied. The Feel Differential Pressure was rectified by performed cleaned electrical connector plug of elevator feel computer. The test on ground found the problem had been solved.

At 2320 UTC, (0620 on 29 October 2018 LT), the aircraft departed from Jakarta with intended destination of Pangkal Pinang. The DFDR recorded a difference between left and right AoA of about 20° and continued until the end of recording. During rotation the left control column stick shaker activated and continued for most of the flight.

During the flight the SIC asked the controller to confirm the altitude of the aircraft and later also asked the speed as shown on the controller radar display. The SIC reported experienced„flight control problem‟.

After the flaps retracted, the DFDR recorded automatic AND trim active followed by flight crew commanded ANU trim. The automatic AND trim stopped when the flaps extended. When the flaps retracted to 0, the automatic AND trim and flight crew commanded ANU trim began again and continued for the remainder of the flight. At 23:31:54 UTC, the DFDR stopped recording.

Until the publishing of this Preliminary Report, the CVR has not been recovered, the search for CVR is continuing. The investigation will perform several tests including the test of the AoA sensor and the aircraft simulator exercises in the Boeing engineering simulator. The investigation has received the QAR data for flight for analysis.

The investigation involved the NTSB of the United States of America as State of design and State of manufacturer, the TSIB of Singapore and the ATSB of Australia as State provide assistant that assigned accredited representatives according to ICAO Annex 13.

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1 History of the Flight

On 29 October 2018, a Boeing 737-8 (MAX) aircraft registered PK-LQP was being operated by PT. Lion Mentari Airlines (Lion Air) as a scheduled passenger flight from Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta1 with intended destination of Depati Amir Airport (WIPK), Pangkal Pinang2. The scheduled time of departure from Jakarta was 0545 LT (2245 UTC3 on 28 October 2018) as LNI610.

At 2320 UTC, the aircraft departed from Jakarta using runway 25L and intended cruising altitude was 27,000 feet. The LNI610 pilot was instructed to follow the Standard Instrument Departure (SID) of ABASA 1C4.

According to the weight and balance sheet, on board the aircraft were two pilots, five flight attendants and 181 passengers consisted of 178 adult, one child and two infants. The voyage report5 showed that the number of flight attendant on board was six flight attendants.

The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) recorded a difference between left and right Angle of Attack (AoA)6 of about 20° and continued until the end of recording. During rotation the left control column stick shaker7 activated and continued for most of the flight.

Shortly after departure, the Jakarta Tower controller instructed LNI610 to contact Terminal East (TE) controller. At 23:21:22 UTC, the LNI60 SIC made initial contact with the TE controller who responded that the aircraft was identified on the controller Aircraft Situational Display/ASD (radar display). Thereafter, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to climb to altitude 27,000 feet.

At 23:21:28 UTC, the LNI610 SIC asked the TE controller to confirm the altitude of the aircraft as shown on the TE controller radar display. The TE controller responded that the aircraft altitude was 900 feet and was acknowledged by the LNI610 Second in Command (SIC).

At 23:21:53 UTC, the LNI610 SIC requested approval to the TE controller “to some holding point”. The TE controller asked the LNI610 the problem of the aircraft andthe pilot responded “flight control problem”.

The LNI610 descended from altitude 1,700 to 1,600 feet and the TE controller then asked the LNI610 of the intended altitude. The LNI610 SIC advised the TE controller that the intended altitude was 5,000 feet.

At 23:22:05 UTC, the DFDR recorded the aircraft altitude was approximately 2,150 feet and the flaps were retracted. After the flaps reached 0, the DFDR recorded automatic aircraft nose down (AND) trim active for 10 seconds followed by flight crew commanded aircraft nose up (ANU) trim.

At 23:22:31 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to climb and maintain altitude of 5,000 feet and to turn left heading 050°. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:22:48 UTC, the flaps extended to 5 and the automatic AND trim stopped.

At 23:22:56 UTC, the LNI610 SIC asked the TE controller the speed as indicated on the radar display. The TE controller responded to the LNI610 that the ground speed of the aircraft shown on the radar display was 322 knots.

At 23:24:51 UTC, the TE controller added “FLIGHT CONT TROB” text for LNI610 target label on the controller radar system as reminder that the flight was experiencing flight control problem.

At 23:25:05 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn left heading 350° and maintain altitude of 5,000 feet. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:25:18 UTC, the flaps retracted to 0. At 23:25:27 UTC, the automatic AND trim and flight crew commanded ANU trim recorded began again and continued for the remainder of the flight.

At 23:26:32 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn right heading 050° and maintain altitude of 5,000 feet. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:26:59 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn right heading 070° to avoid traffic. The LNI610 pilot did not respond to the TE controller‟s instruction, thereafter, the controller called the LNI610 twice who responded at 23:27:13 UTC.

At 23:27:15 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn right heading 090° which was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC. A few second later, the TE controller revised the instruction to stop the turn and fly heading 070° which was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:28:15 UTC, the TE controller provided traffic information to the LNI610 who responded “ZERO”. About 14 seconds later, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to turn left heading 050° and maintain an altitude of 5,000 feet. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:29:37 UTC, the TE controller questioned the LNI610 whether the aircraft was descending as the TE controller noticed that the aircraft was descending. The LNI610 SIC advised the TE controller that they had a flight control problem and were flying the aircraft manually.

At 23:29:45 UTC, the TE controller instructed the LNI610 to maintain heading 050° and contact the Arrival (ARR) controller. The instruction was acknowledged by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:30:03 UTC, the LNI610 contacted the ARR controller and advised that they were experiencing a flight control problem. The ARR controller advised LNI610 to prepare for landing on runway 25L and instructed them to fly heading 070°. The instruction was read back by the LNI610 SIC.

At 23:30:58 UTC, the LNI610 SIC stated “LNI650 due to weather request proceed to ESALA8” which was approved by the ARR controller.

At 23:31:09 UTC, the LNI610 PIC advised the ARR controller that the altitude of the aircraft could not be determined due to all aircraft instruments indicating different altitudes. The pilot used the call sign of LNI650 during the communication. The ARR controller acknowledged then stated “LNI610 no restriction”.

At 23:31:23 UTC, the LNI610 PIC requested the ARR controller to block altitude 3,000 feet above and below for traffic avoidance. The ARR controller asked what altitude the pilot wanted. At 23:31:35 UTC, the LNI610 PIC responded “five thou”. The ARR controller approved the pilot request.

At 23:31:54 UTC, the FDR stopped recording.

The ARR controller attempted to contact LNI610 twice with no response. At 23:32:19 UTC, the LNI610 target disappeared from the ASD and changed to flight plan track. The ARR controller and TE controller attempted to contact LNI610 four more times with no response.

The ARR controller then checked the last known coordinates of LNI610 and instructed the assistant to report the occurrence to the operations manager.

The ARR controller requested several aircraft to hold over the last known position of LNI610 and to conduct a visual search of the area.

About 0005 UTC (0705 LT), tug boat personnel found floating debris at 5°48’56.04″S; 107° 7’23.04″E which was about 33 Nm from Jakarta on bearing 56°. The debris was later identified as LNI610.

Read the full report: CLICK HERE

Boeing statement on Lion Air flight 610 preliminary report

Delivered August 13, 2018, crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018

Boeing issued this statement after the Indonesian government issued its preliminary report on the tragic crash of Lion Air flight 610 in the Java Sea:

The Boeing Company is deeply saddened by the loss of Lion Air Flight 610. We extend our heartfelt condolences and sympathies to the families and loved ones of those onboard.

Safety is a core value for everyone at Boeing and the safety of our airplanes, our customers’ passengers and their crews is always our top priority. As our customers and their passengers continue to fly the 737 MAX to hundreds of destinations around the world every day, they have our assurance that the 737 MAX is as safe as any airplane that has ever flown the skies.

Boeing appreciates Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) for its ongoing efforts to investigate the causes of the accident. Boeing is taking every measure to fully understand all aspects of this accident, working closely with the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board as technical advisors to support the NTSC as the investigation continues.

Earlier today, the NTSC released its preliminary accident investigation report.  The report provides detailed accounts of Flight 610 and of the immediately preceding flight of the same aircraft.

The report explains that the maintenance logs for the accident aircraft recorded problems related to airspeed and altitude on each of the four flights that occurred over the three days prior to Flight 610. The logs indicate that various maintenance procedures were performed, but issues related to airspeed and altitude continued on each successive flight. The logs indicate that, among other procedures, on Oct. 27, two days prior to the incident flight, one of the airplane’s Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors was replaced.

On Oct. 28, before the flight immediately prior to Flight 610, the pilot in command and the maintenance engineer discussed the maintenance that had been performed on the aircraft. The engineer informed the pilot that the AOA sensor had been replaced and tested. The report does not include records as to the installation or calibration of the new sensor, nor does the report indicate whether the sensor was new or refurbished.  Although the report states that the pilot was satisfied by the information relayed by the engineer that the AOA sensor had been replaced and tested, on the subsequent flight the pilots again experienced problems with erroneous airspeed data, and also experienced automatic nose down trim.

The report states that the flight crew of the Oct. 28 flight turned off the stabilizer trim switches within minutes of experiencing the automatic nose down trim, and continued with manual trim through the end of the flight. The report further notes that the pilot performed three non-normal checklist procedures, including the runaway stabilizer non-normal checklist, which is a memory item prescribed by the 737 MAX Flight Crew Operations Manual, and reaffirmed in Boeing Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin TBC-19 and FAA Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) Number 2018-23-51, as the appropriate procedure to address unintended horizontal stabilizer movement, regardless of source.

The report indicates that the remainder of the Oct. 28 flight was uneventful and that the flight continued to its destination. The report also states that, after landing, the pilot reported some of the experienced issues both on the aircraft maintenance log and to engineering. The report states that the pilot ran the runaway stabilizer non-normal check list, but it does not state that he communicated that fact in the maintenance documentation following that flight.

The following day, Oct. 29, shortly after taking off, the pilots experienced issues with altitude and airspeed data that the pilots had previously experienced on the earlier flights, due to erroneous AOA data. Data from the flight data recorder summarized in the report also makes clear that, as on the previous flight, the airplane experienced automatic nose down trim. In response, the flight crew repeatedly commanded nose up trim. This sequence repeated for the remainder of the flight, during which the flight crew was able to maintain control of the airplane for approximately ten minutes. Unlike as is stated with respect to the prior flight, the report does not state whether the pilots performed the runaway stabilizer procedure or cut out the stabilizer trim switches.

In accordance with international protocol, all inquiries about the ongoing accident investigation must be directed to the NTSC.

Top Copyright Photo: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQP (msn 43000) BFI (James Helbock). Image: 944190.

Lion Air aircraft slide show:

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Boeing statement on MAX 8 Operations Manual Bulletin

Delivered August 13, 2018, crashed into the Java Sea on October 29, 2018

Boeing issued this statement:

Boeing is providing support and technical assistance to the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee and other government authorities responsible for the investigation into Lion Air flight 610.

 

The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has indicated that Lion Air flight 610 experienced erroneous input from one of its AOA (Angle of Attack) sensors. 

 

Whenever appropriate, Boeing, as part of its usual processes, issues bulletins or makes recommendations regarding the operation of its aircraft. 

 

On November 6, 2018, Boeing issued an Operations Manual Bulletin (OMB) directing operators to existing flight crew procedures to address circumstances where there is erroneous input from an AOA sensor. 

 

The investigation into Lion Air flight 610 is ongoing and Boeing continues to cooperate fully and provide technical assistance at the request and under the direction of government authorities investigating the accident.

Top Copyright Photo: Lion Air (PT Lion Mentari Airlines) Boeing 737-8 MAX 8 PK-LQP (msn 43000) BFI (James Helbock). Image: 944190.

Lion Air aircraft slide show:

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